!438 [sync] PR-436: sync patches from upstream

From: @openeuler-sync-bot Reviewed-by: @xujing99 Signed-off-by: @xujing99
sync patches from upstream
2024-12-02 11:50:02 +00:00 · 2024-12-02 17:10:12 +08:00 · 2024-11-27 03:59:00 +00:00 · 2024-11-27 11:12:21 +08:00 · 2024-11-26 11:03:42 +00:00 · 2024-11-26 17:17:59 +08:00
19 changed files with 1751 additions and 5 deletions
--- a/Support-sm2p256v1-of-ECDSA-and-sm3-of-hash.patch
+++ b/Support-sm2p256v1-of-ECDSA-and-sm3-of-hash.patch
@ -0,0 +1,251 @@
+From 32ab7eb58556d41df302af8166a77f2f2bf38754 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: xujing <xujing125@huawei.com>
+Date: Wed, 18 Sep 2024 15:57:34 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH] Support sm2p256v1 of ECDSA and sm3 of hash
+
+---
+ include/rpm/rpmcrypto.h  |  1 +
+ include/rpm/rpmpgp.h     |  2 ++
+ macros.in                |  4 +++
+ rpmio/digest_libgcrypt.c |  6 ++++
+ rpmio/digest_openssl.c   | 69 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
+ rpmio/rpmpgp_internal.c  |  1 +
+ rpmio/rpmpgpval.h        |  1 +
+ sign/rpmsignfiles.c      |  4 +++
+ 8 files changed, 87 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/include/rpm/rpmcrypto.h b/include/rpm/rpmcrypto.h
+index 69d329f..ef36e7a 100644
+--- a/include/rpm/rpmcrypto.h
+++ b/include/rpm/rpmcrypto.h
+@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ typedef enum rpmHashAlgo_e {
+     RPM_HASH_SHA384		=  9,	/*!< SHA384 */
+     RPM_HASH_SHA512		= 10,	/*!< SHA512 */
+     RPM_HASH_SHA224		= 11,	/*!< SHA224 */
+    RPM_HASH_SM3		= 109,	/*!< SM3, the definition is the same as that of libgcrypt */
+ } rpmHashAlgo;
+ 
+ /** \ingroup rpmcrypto
+diff --git a/include/rpm/rpmpgp.h b/include/rpm/rpmpgp.h
+index a3238a6..0d46941 100644
+--- a/include/rpm/rpmpgp.h
+++ b/include/rpm/rpmpgp.h
+@@ -274,6 +274,7 @@ typedef enum pgpHashAlgo_e {
+     PGPHASHALGO_SHA384		=  9,	/*!< SHA384 */
+     PGPHASHALGO_SHA512		= 10,	/*!< SHA512 */
+     PGPHASHALGO_SHA224		= 11,	/*!< SHA224 */
+    PGPHASHALGO_SM3		= 109,	/*!< SM3, the definition is the same as that of libgcrypt */
+ } pgpHashAlgo;
+ 
+ /** \ingroup rpmpgp
+@@ -290,6 +291,7 @@ typedef enum pgpCurveId_e {
+     PGPCURVE_BRAINPOOL_P512R1	=  5,	/*!< brainpoolP512r1 */
+     PGPCURVE_ED25519		=  6,	/*!< Ed25519 */
+     PGPCURVE_CURVE25519		=  7,	/*!< Curve25519 */
+    PGPCURVE_SM2P256V1		=  8,	/*!< sm2p256v1 */
+ } pgpCurveId;
+ 
+ /** \ingroup rpmpgp
+diff --git a/macros.in b/macros.in
+index 11c70be..1b05672 100644
+--- a/macros.in
+++ b/macros.in
+@@ -597,6 +597,10 @@ package or when debugging this package.\
+ 	-sbo %{shescape:%{?__signature_filename}} \
+ 	%{?__plaintext_filename:-- %{shescape:%{__plaintext_filename}}}
+ 
+# The sm3 hash algorithm and sm2p256v1 encryption and decryption algorithm
+# in ECDSA are disabled by default.
+%_enable_sm2p256v1_sm3_algo	0
+
+ #==============================================================================
+ # ---- Transaction macros.
+ #	Macro(s) used to parameterize transactions.
+diff --git a/rpmio/digest_libgcrypt.c b/rpmio/digest_libgcrypt.c
+index 7a75d2d..d14cc52 100644
+--- a/rpmio/digest_libgcrypt.c
+++ b/rpmio/digest_libgcrypt.c
+@@ -42,6 +42,9 @@ size_t rpmDigestLength(int hashalgo)
+ 	return 28;
+     case RPM_HASH_SHA256:
+ 	return 32;
+    case RPM_HASH_SM3:
+	if (rpmExpandNumeric("%{?_enable_sm2p256v1_sm3_algo}"))
+	    return 32;
+     case RPM_HASH_SHA384:
+ 	return 48;
+     case RPM_HASH_SHA512:
+@@ -66,6 +69,9 @@ static int hashalgo2gcryalgo(int hashalgo)
+ 	return GCRY_MD_SHA384;
+     case RPM_HASH_SHA512:
+ 	return GCRY_MD_SHA512;
+    case RPM_HASH_SM3:
+	if (rpmExpandNumeric("%{?_enable_sm2p256v1_sm3_algo}"))
+	    return GCRY_MD_SM3;
+     default:
+ 	return 0;
+     }
+diff --git a/rpmio/digest_openssl.c b/rpmio/digest_openssl.c
+index eb9fbaa..92b8113 100644
+--- a/rpmio/digest_openssl.c
+++ b/rpmio/digest_openssl.c
+@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
+ #include <openssl/ec.h>
+ 
+ #include <rpm/rpmcrypto.h>
+#include <rpm/rpmmacro.h>
+ #include "rpmio/rpmpgp_internal.h"
+ 
+ 
+@@ -188,6 +189,10 @@ static const EVP_MD *getEVPMD(int hashalgo)
+     case RPM_HASH_SHA224:
+         return EVP_sha224();
+ 
+    case RPM_HASH_SM3:
+        if (rpmExpandNumeric("%{?_enable_sm2p256v1_sm3_algo}"))
+            return EVP_sm3();
+
+     default:
+         return EVP_md_null();
+     }
+@@ -837,6 +842,14 @@ static int constructECDSASigningKey(struct pgpDigKeyECDSA_s *key, int curve)
+ 	    OSSL_PARAM_END
+ 	};
+ 	key->evp_pkey = construct_pkey_from_param(EVP_PKEY_EC, params);
+    } else if (curve == PGPCURVE_SM2P256V1 &&
+	       rpmExpandNumeric("%{?_enable_sm2p256v1_sm3_algo}")) {
+	OSSL_PARAM params[] = {
+            OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string("group", "SM2", 3),
+            OSSL_PARAM_octet_string("pub", key->q, key->qlen),
+            OSSL_PARAM_END
+        };
+        key->evp_pkey = construct_pkey_from_param(EVP_PKEY_SM2, params);
+     }
+     return key->evp_pkey ? 1 : 0;
+ #else
+@@ -950,6 +963,46 @@ static void pgpFreeSigECDSA(pgpDigAlg pgpsig)
+     free(pgpsig->data);
+ }
+ 
+/* Source of zin information refer to https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-shen-sm2-ecdsa-02.html#appendix-D */
+const unsigned char zin_default[] = {
+  0x00, 0x80, /* id length */
+  0x31, 0x32, 0x33, 0x34, 0x35, 0x36, 0x37, 0x38, 0x31, 0x32, 0x33, 0x34,
+  0x35, 0x36, 0x37, 0x38, /* default id: 1234567812345678 */
+  0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xfe, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
+  0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+  0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xfc, /* sm2 a */
+  0x28, 0xe9, 0xfa, 0x9e, 0x9d, 0x9f, 0x5e, 0x34, 0x4d, 0x5a, 0x9e, 0x4b,
+  0xcf, 0x65, 0x09, 0xa7, 0xf3, 0x97, 0x89, 0xf5, 0x15, 0xab, 0x8f, 0x92,
+  0xdd, 0xbc, 0xbd, 0x41, 0x4d, 0x94, 0x0e, 0x93, /* sm2 b */
+  0x32, 0xc4, 0xae, 0x2c, 0x1f, 0x19, 0x81, 0x19, 0x5f, 0x99, 0x04, 0x46,
+  0x6a, 0x39, 0xc9, 0x94, 0x8f, 0xe3, 0x0b, 0xbf, 0xf2, 0x66, 0x0b, 0xe1,
+  0x71, 0x5a, 0x45, 0x89, 0x33, 0x4c, 0x74, 0xc7, /* sm2 x */
+  0xbc, 0x37, 0x36, 0xa2, 0xf4, 0xf6, 0x77, 0x9c, 0x59, 0xbd, 0xce, 0xe3,
+  0x6b, 0x69, 0x21, 0x53, 0xd0, 0xa9, 0x87, 0x7c, 0xc6, 0x2a, 0x47, 0x40,
+  0x02, 0xdf, 0x32, 0xe5, 0x21, 0x39, 0xf0, 0xa0 /* sm2 y */
+};
+
+static int calculate_sm2_hash(struct pgpDigKeyECDSA_s *key, uint8_t *msg, size_t msglen, uint8_t *hash)
+{
+    unsigned char z[32];
+
+    EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+
+    EVP_DigestInit(ctx, EVP_sm3());
+    EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, zin_default, sizeof(zin_default));
+    EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, key->q + 1, key->qlen - 1);
+    EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, z, NULL);
+
+    EVP_DigestInit(ctx, EVP_sm3());
+    EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, z, sizeof(z));
+    EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, msg, msglen);
+    EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, hash, NULL);
+
+    EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+ static int pgpVerifySigECDSA(pgpDigAlg pgpkey, pgpDigAlg pgpsig,
+                            uint8_t *hash, size_t hashlen, int hash_algo)
+ {
+@@ -959,6 +1012,8 @@ static int pgpVerifySigECDSA(pgpDigAlg pgpkey, pgpDigAlg pgpsig,
+     unsigned char *xsig = NULL;		/* signature encoded for X509 */
+     size_t xsig_len = 0;
+     EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
+    uint8_t *hash_to_use = hash;
+    uint8_t sm2_hash[32] = { 0 };
+ 
+     if (!constructECDSASigningKey(key, pgpkey->curve))
+         goto done;
+@@ -974,7 +1029,16 @@ static int pgpVerifySigECDSA(pgpDigAlg pgpkey, pgpDigAlg pgpsig,
+     if (EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pkey_ctx) != 1)
+         goto done;
+ 
+-    if (EVP_PKEY_verify(pkey_ctx, xsig, xsig_len, hash, hashlen) == 1)
+    if (pgpkey->curve == PGPCURVE_SM2P256V1) {
+        if (rpmExpandNumeric("%{?_enable_sm2p256v1_sm3_algo}")) {
+            calculate_sm2_hash(key, hash, hashlen, sm2_hash);
+            hash_to_use = sm2_hash;
+        } else {
+            goto done;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (EVP_PKEY_verify(pkey_ctx, xsig, xsig_len, hash_to_use, hashlen) == 1)
+     {
+         /* Success */
+         rc = 0;
+@@ -1109,6 +1173,9 @@ static int pgpSupportedCurve(int algo, int curve)
+ 	return 1;
+     if (algo == PGPPUBKEYALGO_ECDSA && curve == PGPCURVE_NIST_P_521)
+ 	return 1;
+    if (algo == PGPPUBKEYALGO_ECDSA && curve == PGPCURVE_SM2P256V1 &&
+	rpmExpandNumeric("%{?_enable_sm2p256v1_sm3_algo}"))
+	return 1;
+     return 0;
+ }
+ 
+diff --git a/rpmio/rpmpgp_internal.c b/rpmio/rpmpgp_internal.c
+index 8b845b7..0960057 100644
+--- a/rpmio/rpmpgp_internal.c
+++ b/rpmio/rpmpgp_internal.c
+@@ -537,6 +537,7 @@ static uint8_t curve_oids[] = {
+     PGPCURVE_BRAINPOOL_P512R1,	0x09, 0x2b, 0x24, 0x03, 0x03, 0x02, 0x08, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0d,
+     PGPCURVE_ED25519,		0x09, 0x2b, 0x06, 0x01, 0x04, 0x01, 0xda, 0x47, 0x0f, 0x01,
+     PGPCURVE_CURVE25519,	0x0a, 0x2b, 0x06, 0x01, 0x04, 0x01, 0x97, 0x55, 0x01, 0x05, 0x01,
+    PGPCURVE_SM2P256V1,		0x08, 0x2a, 0x81, 0x1c, 0xcf, 0x55, 0x1, 0x82, 0x2d,
+     0,   
+ };
+ 
+diff --git a/rpmio/rpmpgpval.h b/rpmio/rpmpgpval.h
+index ad8ed08..b8b7cb4 100644
+--- a/rpmio/rpmpgpval.h
+++ b/rpmio/rpmpgpval.h
+@@ -77,6 +77,7 @@ static struct pgpValTbl_s const pgpHashTbl[] = {
+     { PGPHASHALGO_SHA384,	"SHA384" },
+     { PGPHASHALGO_SHA512,	"SHA512" },
+     { PGPHASHALGO_SHA224,	"SHA224" },
+    { PGPHASHALGO_SM3,  	"SM3" },
+     { -1,			"Unknown hash algorithm" },
+ };
+ 
+diff --git a/sign/rpmsignfiles.c b/sign/rpmsignfiles.c
+index 80ef233..fa20bf6 100644
+--- a/sign/rpmsignfiles.c
+++ b/sign/rpmsignfiles.c
+@@ -19,6 +19,10 @@
+ 
+ #define MAX_SIGNATURE_LENGTH 1024
+ 
+/*
+ * Currently, we do not support the sm3 hash algorithm to sign files.
+ * Therefore, we do not add sm3.
+ */
+ static const char *hash_algo_name[] = {
+     [RPM_HASH_MD5]          = "md5",
+     [RPM_HASH_SHA1]         = "sha1",
+-- 
+2.33.0
+
--- a/Unbundle-config-site-and-add-RPM-LD-FLAGS-macro.patch
+++ b/Unbundle-config-site-and-add-RPM-LD-FLAGS-macro.patch
@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ index a2411d7..8cb8a5a 100644
   RPM_OS=\"%{_os}\"\
   RPM_BUILD_NCPUS=\"%{_smp_build_ncpus}\"\
 -  export RPM_SOURCE_DIR RPM_BUILD_DIR RPM_OPT_FLAGS RPM_ARCH RPM_OS RPM_BUILD_NCPUS\
-+  export RPM_SOURCE_DIR RPM_BUILD_DIR RPM_OPT_FLAGS RPM_ARCH RPM_OS RPM_BUILD_NCPUS RPM_OPT_FLAGS\
+  export RPM_SOURCE_DIR RPM_BUILD_DIR RPM_OPT_FLAGS RPM_ARCH RPM_OS RPM_BUILD_NCPUS RPM_LD_FLAGS\
   RPM_DOC_DIR=\"%{_docdir}\"\
   export RPM_DOC_DIR\
   RPM_PACKAGE_NAME=\"%{NAME}\"\
--- a/backport-Add-ECDSA-support-to-digest_openssl.patch
+++ b/backport-Add-ECDSA-support-to-digest_openssl.patch
@ -0,0 +1,263 @@
+From d2d35d1acb89d4113647a9aad2d049808112b935 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Michael Schroeder <mls@suse.de>
+Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2024 14:07:53 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Add ECDSA support to digest_openssl
+
+Conflict:modify digest_openssl.c in rpmio; adapt context
+Reference:https://github.com/rpm-software-management/rpmpgp_legacy/commit/783a5ea3851b8509eb11a4998d6e4ea41cc7ba38
+---
+ rpmio/digest_openssl.c | 208 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 207 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/rpmio/digest_openssl.c b/rpmio/digest_openssl.c
+index 4d930c9..c8eb15f 100644
+--- a/rpmio/digest_openssl.c
+++ b/rpmio/digest_openssl.c
+@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
+ #endif
+ #include <openssl/rsa.h>
+ #include <openssl/dsa.h>
+#include <openssl/ec.h>
+ 
+ #include <rpm/rpmcrypto.h>
+ #include "rpmio/rpmpgp_internal.h"
+@@ -801,6 +802,181 @@ done:
+     return rc;
+ }
+ 
+/****************************** ECDSA ***************************************/
+
+struct pgpDigKeyECDSA_s {
+    EVP_PKEY *evp_pkey; /* Fully constructed key */
+    unsigned char *q;	/* compressed point */
+    int qlen;
+};
+
+static int constructECDSASigningKey(struct pgpDigKeyECDSA_s *key, int curve)
+{
+    if (key->evp_pkey)
+	return 1;	/* We've already constructed it, so just reuse it */
+
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_MAJOR >= 3
+    if (curve == PGPCURVE_NIST_P_256) {
+	OSSL_PARAM params[] = {
+	    OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string("group", "P-256", 5),
+	    OSSL_PARAM_octet_string("pub", key->q, key->qlen),
+	    OSSL_PARAM_END
+	};
+	key->evp_pkey = construct_pkey_from_param(EVP_PKEY_EC, params);
+    } else if (curve == PGPCURVE_NIST_P_384) {
+	OSSL_PARAM params[] = {
+	    OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string("group", "P-384", 5),
+	    OSSL_PARAM_octet_string("pub", key->q, key->qlen),
+	    OSSL_PARAM_END
+	};
+	key->evp_pkey = construct_pkey_from_param(EVP_PKEY_EC, params);
+    }
+    return key->evp_pkey ? 1 : 0;
+#else
+    /* Create the EC key */
+    EC_KEY *ec = NULL;
+    if (curve == PGPCURVE_NIST_P_256)
+	ec = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1);
+    else if (curve == PGPCURVE_NIST_P_384)
+	ec = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp384r1);
+    if (!ec)
+	return 0;
+
+    if (!EC_KEY_oct2key(ec, key->q, key->qlen, NULL))
+        goto exit;
+
+    /* Create an EVP_PKEY container to abstract the key-type. */
+    if (!(key->evp_pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()))
+	goto exit;
+
+    /* Assign the EC key to the EVP_PKEY structure.
+       This will take over memory management of the RSA key */
+    if (!EVP_PKEY_assign_EC_KEY(key->evp_pkey, ec)) {
+        EVP_PKEY_free(key->evp_pkey);
+        key->evp_pkey = NULL;
+	goto exit;
+    }
+    return 1;
+
+exit:
+    EC_KEY_free(ec);
+    return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+static int pgpSetKeyMpiECDSA(pgpDigAlg pgpkey, int num, const uint8_t *p)
+{
+    size_t mlen = pgpMpiLen(p) - 2;
+    struct pgpDigKeyECDSA_s *key = pgpkey->data;
+    int rc = 1;
+
+    if (!key)
+	key = pgpkey->data = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*key));
+    if (num == 0 && !key->q && mlen > 1 && p[2] == 0x04) {
+	key->qlen = mlen;
+	key->q = xmalloc(key->qlen);
+	memcpy(key->q, p + 2, key->qlen),
+	rc = 0;
+    }
+    return rc;
+}
+
+static void pgpFreeKeyECDSA(pgpDigAlg pgpkey)
+{
+    struct pgpDigKeyECDSA_s *key = pgpkey->data;
+    if (key) {
+	if (key->q)
+	    free(key->q);
+	if (key->evp_pkey)
+	    EVP_PKEY_free(key->evp_pkey);
+	free(key);
+    }
+}
+
+struct pgpDigSigECDSA_s {
+    unsigned char *r;
+    int rlen;
+    unsigned char *s;
+    int slen;
+};
+
+static int pgpSetSigMpiECDSA(pgpDigAlg pgpsig, int num, const uint8_t *p)
+{
+    int mlen = pgpMpiLen(p) - 2;
+    int rc = 1;
+
+    struct pgpDigSigECDSA_s *sig = pgpsig->data;
+    if (!sig) {
+        sig = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*sig));
+	pgpsig->data = sig;
+    }
+
+    switch (num) {
+    case 0:
+        if (sig->r)
+            return 1;	/* This should only ever happen once per signature */
+	sig->rlen = mlen;
+        sig->r = memcpy(xmalloc(mlen), p + 2, mlen);
+        rc = 0;
+        break;
+    case 1:
+        if (sig->s)
+            return 1;	/* This should only ever happen once per signature */
+	sig->slen = mlen;
+        sig->s = memcpy(xmalloc(mlen), p + 2, mlen);
+        rc = 0;
+        break;
+    }
+
+    return rc;
+}
+
+static void pgpFreeSigECDSA(pgpDigAlg pgpsig)
+{
+    struct pgpDigSigECDSA_s *sig = pgpsig->data;
+    if (sig) {
+	free(sig->r);
+	free(sig->s);
+    }
+    free(pgpsig->data);
+}
+
+static int pgpVerifySigECDSA(pgpDigAlg pgpkey, pgpDigAlg pgpsig,
+                           uint8_t *hash, size_t hashlen, int hash_algo)
+{
+    int rc = 1; /* assume failure */
+    struct pgpDigSigECDSA_s *sig = pgpsig->data;
+    struct pgpDigKeyECDSA_s *key = pgpkey->data;
+    unsigned char *xsig = NULL;		/* signature encoded for X509 */
+    size_t xsig_len = 0;
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
+
+    if (!constructECDSASigningKey(key, pgpkey->curve))
+        goto done;
+
+    xsig = constructDSASignature(sig->r, sig->rlen, sig->s, sig->slen, &xsig_len);
+    if (!xsig)
+        goto done;
+
+    pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(key->evp_pkey, NULL);
+    if (!pkey_ctx)
+        goto done;
+
+    if (EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pkey_ctx) != 1)
+        goto done;
+
+    if (EVP_PKEY_verify(pkey_ctx, xsig, xsig_len, hash, hashlen) == 1)
+    {
+        /* Success */
+        rc = 0;
+    }
+
+done:
+    if (pkey_ctx)
+	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
+    free(xsig);
+    return rc;
+}
+ 
+ /****************************** EDDSA ***************************************/
+ 
+@@ -912,6 +1088,19 @@ static int pgpVerifyNULL(pgpDigAlg pgpkey, pgpDigAlg pgpsig,
+     return 1;
+ }
+ 
+static int pgpSupportedCurve(int algo, int curve)
+{
+#ifdef EVP_PKEY_ED25519
+    if (algo == PGPPUBKEYALGO_EDDSA && curve == PGPCURVE_ED25519)
+	return 1;
+#endif
+    if (algo == PGPPUBKEYALGO_ECDSA && curve == PGPCURVE_NIST_P_256)
+	return 1;
+    if (algo == PGPPUBKEYALGO_ECDSA && curve == PGPCURVE_NIST_P_384)
+	return 1;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+ /****************************** PGP **************************************/
+ pgpDigAlg pgpPubkeyNew(int algo, int curve)
+ {
+@@ -928,9 +1117,20 @@ pgpDigAlg pgpPubkeyNew(int algo, int curve)
+         ka->free = pgpFreeKeyDSA;
+         ka->mpis = 4;
+         break;
+    case PGPPUBKEYALGO_ECDSA:
+	if (!pgpSupportedCurve(algo, curve)) {
+	    ka->setmpi = pgpSetMpiNULL;
+	    ka->mpis = -1;
+	    break;
+	}
+        ka->setmpi = pgpSetKeyMpiECDSA;
+        ka->free = pgpFreeKeyECDSA;
+        ka->mpis = 1;
+        ka->curve = curve;
+	break;
+ #ifdef EVP_PKEY_ED25519
+     case PGPPUBKEYALGO_EDDSA:
+-	if (curve != PGPCURVE_ED25519) {
+	if (!pgpSupportedCurve(algo, curve)) {
+ 	    ka->setmpi = pgpSetMpiNULL;	/* unsupported curve */
+ 	    ka->mpis = -1;
+ 	    break;
+@@ -969,6 +1169,12 @@ pgpDigAlg pgpSignatureNew(int algo)
+         sa->verify = pgpVerifySigDSA;
+         sa->mpis = 2;
+         break;
+    case PGPPUBKEYALGO_ECDSA:
+        sa->setmpi = pgpSetSigMpiECDSA;
+        sa->free = pgpFreeSigECDSA;
+        sa->verify = pgpVerifySigECDSA;
+        sa->mpis = 2;
+        break;
+ #ifdef EVP_PKEY_ED25519
+     case PGPPUBKEYALGO_EDDSA:
+         sa->setmpi = pgpSetSigMpiEDDSA;
+-- 
+2.23.0
+
--- a/backport-Allow-signing-with-ECDSA-keys.patch
+++ b/backport-Allow-signing-with-ECDSA-keys.patch
@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+From ef0afa856a609bea765dbccaebb75ceeddd202f3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Michael Schroeder <mls@suse.de>
+Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2024 14:40:29 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Allow signing with ECDSA keys
+
+Conflict:NA
+Reference:https://github.com/rpm-software-management/rpm/commit/ef0afa856a609bea765dbccaebb75ceeddd202f3
+
+Key import and verification already works, it's just that rpm
+does not know where to put the signature.
+---
+ sign/rpmgensig.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+diff --git a/sign/rpmgensig.c b/sign/rpmgensig.c
+index d7d08a2a3..4d2bbc31f 100644
+--- a/sign/rpmgensig.c
+++ b/sign/rpmgensig.c
+@@ -158,6 +158,7 @@ static rpmtd makeSigTag(Header sigh, int ishdr, uint8_t *pkt, size_t pktlen)
+     pubkey_algo = pgpDigParamsAlgo(sigp, PGPVAL_PUBKEYALGO);
+     switch (pubkey_algo) {
+     case PGPPUBKEYALGO_DSA:
+    case PGPPUBKEYALGO_ECDSA:
+     case PGPPUBKEYALGO_EDDSA:
+ 	sigtag = ishdr ? RPMSIGTAG_DSA : RPMSIGTAG_GPG;
+ 	break;
+-- 
+2.23.0
+
--- a/backport-Allow-version-to-be-omitted-in-the-replace-test-spec.patch
+++ b/backport-Allow-version-to-be-omitted-in-the-replace-test-spec.patch
@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+From 2c20f9677eff989817148d236543191dec0d8059 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Panu Matilainen <pmatilai@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 14 Nov 2023 09:07:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Allow version to be omitted in the replace test spec
+
+Conflict:adapt context
+Reference:https://github.com/rpm-software-management/rpm/commit/2c20f9677eff989817148d236543191dec0d8059
+
+---
+ tests/data/SPECS/replacetest.spec | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+diff --git a/tests/data/SPECS/replacetest.spec b/tests/data/SPECS/replacetest.spec
+index 0f86ea628..4fb72b408 100644
+--- a/tests/data/SPECS/replacetest.spec
+++ b/tests/data/SPECS/replacetest.spec
+@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
+ %{?fixit: %global havepretrans 1}
+ %{!?user: %global user root}
+ %{!?grp: %global grp root}
+%{!?ver: %global ver 1.0}
+ 
+ Name:		replacetest%{?sub:-%{sub}}
+ Version:	%{ver}
+-- 
+2.33.0
+
--- a/backport-Enforce-the-same-sanity-checks-on-db-add-and-rebuild.patch
+++ b/backport-Enforce-the-same-sanity-checks-on-db-add-and-rebuild.patch
@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+From 1fbf8aeb4e78b8b4afeeaafcbc97b3cbf7cfeaba Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Panu Matilainen <pmatilai@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 17 Sep 2024 08:31:35 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH] Enforce the same sanity checks on db add and rebuild
+
+Conflict:adapt context; don't use RPMTAG_HEADERIMMUTABLE because
+e484d99 is not merged; use int type instead of bool in validHeader()
+Reference:https://github.com/rpm-software-management/rpm/commit/1fbf8aeb4e78b8b4afeeaafcbc97b3cbf7cfeaba
+
+It doesn't make a whole lot of sense to allow inserting headers
+that will get removed as invalid on the next rebuild. Funny what
+oddities have survived all this time...
+
+Fixes: #3306
+---
+ lib/rpmdb.c | 18 +++++++++++++-----
+ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/rpmdb.c b/lib/rpmdb.c
+index 3bf3457f3..dccdf80cd 100644
+--- a/lib/rpmdb.c
+++ b/lib/rpmdb.c
+@@ -2176,6 +2176,17 @@ exit:
+     return (rc == 0) ? RPMRC_OK : RPMRC_FAIL;
+ }
+ 
+static int validHeader(Header h)
+{
+    if (!(headerIsEntry(h, RPMTAG_NAME) &&
+	headerIsEntry(h, RPMTAG_VERSION) &&
+	headerIsEntry(h, RPMTAG_RELEASE)))
+    {
+	return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+ int rpmdbAdd(rpmdb db, Header h)
+ {
+     dbiIndex dbi = NULL;
+@@ -2189,7 +2200,7 @@ int rpmdbAdd(rpmdb db, Header h)
+ 	return 0;
+ 
+     hdrBlob = headerExport(h, &hdrLen);
+-    if (hdrBlob == NULL || hdrLen == 0) {
+    if (!validHeader(h) || hdrBlob == NULL || hdrLen == 0) {
+ 	ret = -1;
+ 	goto exit;
+     }
+@@ -2424,10 +2435,7 @@ int rpmdbRebuild(const char * prefix, rpmts ts,
+ 	while ((h = rpmdbNextIterator(mi)) != NULL) {
+ 
+ 	    /* let's sanity check this record a bit, otherwise just skip it */
+-	    if (!(headerIsEntry(h, RPMTAG_NAME) &&
+-		headerIsEntry(h, RPMTAG_VERSION) &&
+-		headerIsEntry(h, RPMTAG_RELEASE)))
+-	    {
+	    if (!validHeader(h)) {
+ 		rpmlog(RPMLOG_ERR,
+ 			_("header #%u in the database is bad -- skipping.\n"),
+ 			rpmdbGetIteratorOffset(mi));
+-- 
+2.33.0
+
--- a/backport-Fix-FA_TOUCH-ed-files-getting-removed-on-failed-upda.patch
+++ b/backport-Fix-FA_TOUCH-ed-files-getting-removed-on-failed-upda.patch
@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+From 027ef640b33b38ca257bb301bb302e9c71d43c27 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Panu Matilainen <pmatilai@redhat.com>
+Date: Fri, 18 Oct 2024 14:50:35 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix FA_TOUCH'ed files getting removed on failed update
+
+Conflict:modify fsm.c instead of fsm.cc; don't modify testcode because
+the test code differs greatly, it requires the root permission to run
+chown. However, the current test code cannot implement chown. Manual
+test cases will be used to guard test cases.
+Reference:https://github.com/rpm-software-management/rpm/commit/027ef640b33b38ca257bb301bb302e9c71d43c27
+
+On install/update, most files are laid down with a temporary suffix
+and if the update fails, removing those at the end of the loop is
+the right thing to do. However FA_TOUCH'ed files were already there,
+we only update their metadata, and we better not remove them!
+
+AFAICS this all versions since rpm >= 4.14 in one way or the other.
+If %_minimize_writes is enabled then it affects way more than just
+unmodified config files.
+
+The test is a simplified version of pam update failing in the original
+report. Technically, --nomtime should not be needed for the test
+verification but we don't even try to restore the metadata on failure,
+and fixing that is way out of scope here.
+
+Fixes: RHEL-54386
+Fixes: #3284
+---
+ lib/fsm.c |  2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/fsm.c b/lib/fsm.c
+index e3be219c3..ec0303400 100644
+--- a/lib/fsm.c
+++ b/lib/fsm.c
+@@ -1094,7 +1094,7 @@ setmeta:
+ 	    if (ensureDir(NULL, rpmfiDN(fi), 0, 0, 1, &di.dirfd))
+ 		continue;
+ 
+-	    if (fp->stage > FILE_NONE && !fp->skip) {
+	    if (fp->stage > FILE_NONE && !fp->skip && fp->action != FA_TOUCH) {
+ 		(void) fsmRemove(di.dirfd, fp->fpath, fp->sb.st_mode);
+ 	    }
+ 	}
+-- 
+2.33.0
+
--- a/backport-Fix-a-memory-leak-on-rpmdb-importdb.patch
+++ b/backport-Fix-a-memory-leak-on-rpmdb-importdb.patch
@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+From 4b830f7b5a4a70a53e2eef63baf82b7fff308a3c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Panu Matilainen <pmatilai@redhat.com>
+Date: Fri, 11 Oct 2024 14:26:57 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix a memory leak on rpmdb --importdb
+
+Conflict:modify rpmdb.c instead of tools/rpmdb.cc
+Reference:https://github.com/rpm-software-management/rpm/commit/4b830f7b5a4a70a53e2eef63baf82b7fff308a3c
+
+---
+ rpmdb.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+diff --git a/rpmdb.c b/rpmdb.c
+index 20d5d67bd..1736e1ef7 100644
+--- a/rpmdb.c
+++ b/rpmdb.c
+@@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ static int importDB(rpmts ts)
+ 	Header h;
+ 	while ((h = headerRead(fd, HEADER_MAGIC_YES))) {
+ 	    rc += rpmtsImportHeader(txn, h, 0);
+	    headerFree(h);
+ 	}
+     } else {
+ 	rc = -1;
+-- 
+2.33.0
+
--- a/backport-Fix-memleak-when-process-policies.patch
+++ b/backport-Fix-memleak-when-process-policies.patch
@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+From 937e725626eecad2e0c34463e733ae123ba2ff5e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: xujing <xujing125@huawei.com>
+Date: Thu, 12 Sep 2024 20:52:30 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix memleak when process policies
+
+Conflict:NA
+Reference:https://github.com/rpm-software-management/rpm/commit/937e725626eecad2e0c34463e733ae123ba2ff5e
+
+---
+ build/policies.c | 2 ++
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/build/policies.c b/build/policies.c
+index 5d704c0eb..69062ee6a 100644
+--- a/build/policies.c
+++ b/build/policies.c
+@@ -289,6 +289,7 @@ static rpmRC processPolicies(rpmSpec spec, Package pkg, int test)
+ 	mod = freeModule(mod);
+ 	name = _free(name);
+ 	types = _free(types);
+	optCon = poptFreeContext(optCon);
+     }
+ 
+     rc = RPMRC_OK;
+@@ -297,6 +298,7 @@ static rpmRC processPolicies(rpmSpec spec, Package pkg, int test)
+     freeModule(mod);
+     free(name);
+     free(types);
+    poptFreeContext(optCon);
+ 
+     return rc;
+ }
+-- 
+2.33.0
+
--- a/backport-Fix-wrong-return-code-on-O_DIRECTORY-open-of-invalid.patch
+++ b/backport-Fix-wrong-return-code-on-O_DIRECTORY-open-of-invalid.patch
@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+From 89ce4e7ca592f5abafc3f25aeaa07d36a7b43a61 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Panu Matilainen <pmatilai@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 14 Nov 2023 11:37:48 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix wrong return code on O_DIRECTORY open of invalid symlink
+
+Conflict:NA
+Reference:https://github.com/rpm-software-management/rpm/commit/89ce4e7ca592f5abafc3f25aeaa07d36a7b43a61
+
+The dir argument to fsmOpenpath() is supposed to be a rough O_DIRECTORY
+equivalent, and if the path is actually a misowned symlink it should
+return ENOTDIR instead of ELOOP. Makes the resulting error messages
+at least a little more comprehensible.
+---
+ lib/fsm.c | 5 +++--
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/fsm.c b/lib/fsm.c
+index 51f439ef3..091e90554 100644
+--- a/lib/fsm.c
+++ b/lib/fsm.c
+@@ -304,6 +304,7 @@ static int fsmOpenat(int dirfd, const char *path, int flags, int dir)
+     struct stat lsb, sb;
+     int sflags = flags | O_NOFOLLOW;
+     int fd = openat(dirfd, path, sflags);
+    int ffd = fd;
+ 
+     /*
+      * Only ever follow symlinks by root or target owner. Since we can't
+@@ -312,7 +313,7 @@ static int fsmOpenat(int dirfd, const char *path, int flags, int dir)
+      * it could've only been the link owner or root.
+      */
+     if (fd < 0 && errno == ELOOP && flags != sflags) {
+-	int ffd = openat(dirfd, path, flags);
+	ffd = openat(dirfd, path, flags);
+ 	if (ffd >= 0) {
+ 	    if (fstatat(dirfd, path, &lsb, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) == 0) {
+ 		if (fstat(ffd, &sb) == 0) {
+@@ -327,7 +328,7 @@ static int fsmOpenat(int dirfd, const char *path, int flags, int dir)
+     }
+ 
+     /* O_DIRECTORY equivalent */
+-    if (dir && fd >= 0 && fstat(fd, &sb) == 0 && !S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode)) {
+    if (dir && ((fd != ffd) || (fd >= 0 && fstat(fd, &sb) == 0 && !S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode)))) {
+ 	errno = ENOTDIR;
+ 	fsmClose(&fd);
+     }
+-- 
+2.33.0
+
--- a/backport-No-longer-use-the-low-level-API-in-openssl-3.patch
+++ b/backport-No-longer-use-the-low-level-API-in-openssl-3.patch
@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
+From 408f2053da61fa80c5a306b8f87cdd70a7c57a62 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Michael Schroeder <mls@suse.de>
+Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2024 13:05:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] No longer use the low level API in openssl-3
+
+Conflict:modify digest_openssl.c in rpmio; adapt context
+Reference:https://github.com/rpm-software-management/rpmpgp_legacy/commit/de96811994b28d8fb43dfb101a9cbca263eb1ce5
+
+Instead, construct the key with EVP_PKEY_fromdata()
+---
+ rpmio/digest_openssl.c | 73 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 72 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/rpmio/digest_openssl.c b/rpmio/digest_openssl.c
+index 41d77d0..4d930c9 100644
+--- a/rpmio/digest_openssl.c
+++ b/rpmio/digest_openssl.c
+@@ -1,10 +1,13 @@
+ #include "system.h"
+ 
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_MAJOR >= 3
+# include <openssl/params.h>
+#endif
+ #include <openssl/rsa.h>
+ #include <openssl/dsa.h>
+-#include <rpm/rpmcrypto.h>
+ 
+#include <rpm/rpmcrypto.h>
+ #include "rpmio/rpmpgp_internal.h"
+ 
+ 
+@@ -283,6 +286,46 @@ done:
+ }
+ 
+ 
+/*********************** pkey construction *******************************/
+
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_MAJOR >= 3
+
+static EVP_PKEY *
+construct_pkey_from_param(int id, OSSL_PARAM *params)
+{
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(id, NULL);
+    if (!ctx || EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(ctx) <= 0 || EVP_PKEY_fromdata(ctx, &pkey, EVP_PKEY_PUBLIC_KEY, params) <= 0)
+	pkey = NULL;
+    if (ctx)
+	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
+    return pkey;
+}
+
+static OSSL_PARAM 
+create_bn_param(char *key, BIGNUM *bn)
+{
+    int sz = bn ? BN_num_bytes(bn) : -1;
+    if (sz < 0 || BN_is_negative(bn)) {
+	OSSL_PARAM param = OSSL_PARAM_END;
+	return param;
+    }
+    if (sz == 0)
+	sz = 1;
+    unsigned char *buf = xmalloc(sz);
+    BN_bn2nativepad(bn, buf, sz);
+    OSSL_PARAM param = OSSL_PARAM_BN(key, buf, sz);
+    return param;
+}
+
+static void
+free_bn_param(OSSL_PARAM *param)
+{
+    free(param->data);
+}
+
+#endif
+
+ /****************************** RSA **************************************/
+ 
+ /* Key */
+@@ -300,6 +343,17 @@ static int constructRSASigningKey(struct pgpDigKeyRSA_s *key)
+     if (key->evp_pkey)
+         return 1;	/* We've already constructed it, so just reuse it */
+ 
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_MAJOR >= 3
+    OSSL_PARAM params[] = {
+	create_bn_param("n", key->n),
+	create_bn_param("e", key->e),
+	OSSL_PARAM_END
+    };
+    key->evp_pkey = construct_pkey_from_param(EVP_PKEY_RSA, params);
+    free_bn_param(params + 0);
+    free_bn_param(params + 1);
+    return key->evp_pkey ? 1 : 0;
+#else
+     /* Create the RSA key */
+     RSA *rsa = RSA_new();
+     if (!rsa) return 0;
+@@ -324,6 +378,7 @@ static int constructRSASigningKey(struct pgpDigKeyRSA_s *key)
+ exit:
+     RSA_free(rsa);
+     return 0;
+#endif
+ }
+ 
+ static int pgpSetKeyMpiRSA(pgpDigAlg pgpkey, int num, const uint8_t *p)
+@@ -506,6 +561,21 @@ static int constructDSASigningKey(struct pgpDigKeyDSA_s *key)
+     if (key->evp_pkey)
+         return 1;	/* We've already constructed it, so just reuse it */
+ 
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_MAJOR >= 3
+    OSSL_PARAM params[] = {
+	create_bn_param("p", key->p),
+	create_bn_param("q", key->q),
+	create_bn_param("g", key->g),
+	create_bn_param("pub", key->y),
+	OSSL_PARAM_END
+    };
+    key->evp_pkey = construct_pkey_from_param(EVP_PKEY_DSA, params);
+    free_bn_param(params + 0);
+    free_bn_param(params + 1);
+    free_bn_param(params + 2);
+    free_bn_param(params + 3);
+    return key->evp_pkey ? 1 : 0;
+#else
+     /* Create the DSA key */
+     DSA *dsa = DSA_new();
+     if (!dsa) return 0;
+@@ -533,6 +603,7 @@ static int constructDSASigningKey(struct pgpDigKeyDSA_s *key)
+ exit:
+     DSA_free(dsa);
+     return 0;
+#endif
+ }
+ 
+ 
+-- 
+2.23.0
+
--- a/backport-Refactor-fsmOpenat-return-style-for-consistency-with.patch
+++ b/backport-Refactor-fsmOpenat-return-style-for-consistency-with.patch
@ -0,0 +1,175 @@
+From 14516542c113560dc0070df2f9102568a7a71b58 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Panu Matilainen <pmatilai@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 19 Aug 2024 11:03:10 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH] Refactor fsmOpenat() return style for consistency within the
+ fsm
+
+Conflict:adapt context; don't modify testcode because the test code differs 
+greatly, 0091214 requires the root permission to run chown. However, the
+current test code cannot implement chown. Manual test cases will be used to
+guard test cases.
+Reference:https://github.com/rpm-software-management/rpm/commit/14516542c113560dc0070df2f9102568a7a71b58
+
+Everything inside the fsm is returning a return code as the main
+returned data and file descriptors as one of the arguments, except
+for fsmOpenat() which I for some reason modeled after openat() instead.
+This mismatch makes for some strange code in the callers.
+
+The only visible change here is supposed to be the error message
+changing slightly due to using rpmfileStrerror() instead of strerror().
+
+Co-authored-by: Florian Festi <ffesti@redhat.com>
+---
+ lib/fsm.c     | 62 +++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------------
+ 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/fsm.c b/lib/fsm.c
+index 20b270cf5..b5f8800a8 100644
+--- a/lib/fsm.c
+++ b/lib/fsm.c
+@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ struct filedata_s {
+  * things around needlessly 
+  */ 
+ static const char * fileActionString(rpmFileAction a);
+-static int fsmOpenat(int dirfd, const char *path, int flags, int dir);
+static int fsmOpenat(int *fdp, int dirfd, const char *path, int flags, int dir);
+ static int fsmClose(int *wfdp);
+ 
+ /** \ingroup payload
+@@ -98,9 +98,9 @@ static int fsmLink(int odirfd, const char *opath, int dirfd, const char *path)
+ #if WITH_CAP
+ static int cap_set_fileat(int dirfd, const char *path, cap_t fcaps)
+ {
+-    int rc = -1;
+-    int fd = fsmOpenat(dirfd, path, O_RDONLY|O_NOFOLLOW, 0);
+-    if (fd >= 0) {
+    int fd = -1;
+    int rc = fsmOpenat(&fd, dirfd, path, O_RDONLY|O_NOFOLLOW, 0);
+    if (!rc) {
+ 	rc = cap_set_fd(fd, fcaps);
+ 	fsmClose(&fd);
+     }
+@@ -299,12 +299,13 @@ static int fsmMkdir(int dirfd, const char *path, mode_t mode)
+     return rc;
+ }
+ 
+-static int fsmOpenat(int dirfd, const char *path, int flags, int dir)
+static int fsmOpenat(int *wfdp, int dirfd, const char *path, int flags, int dir)
+ {
+     struct stat lsb, sb;
+     int sflags = flags | O_NOFOLLOW;
+     int fd = openat(dirfd, path, sflags);
+     int ffd = fd;
+    int rc = 0;
+ 
+     /*
+      * Only ever follow symlinks by root or target owner. Since we can't
+@@ -328,11 +329,17 @@ static int fsmOpenat(int dirfd, const char *path, int flags, int dir)
+     }
+ 
+     /* O_DIRECTORY equivalent */
+-    if (dir && ((fd != ffd) || (fd >= 0 && fstat(fd, &sb) == 0 && !S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode)))) {
+-	errno = ENOTDIR;
+    if (!rc && dir && ((fd != ffd) || (fd >= 0 && fstat(fd, &sb) == 0 && !S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode))))
+	rc = RPMERR_ENOTDIR;
+
+    if (!rc && fd < 0)
+	rc = RPMERR_OPEN_FAILED;
+
+    if (rc)
+ 	fsmClose(&fd);
+-    }
+-    return fd;
+
+    *wfdp = fd;
+    return rc;
+ }
+ 
+ static int fsmDoMkDir(rpmPlugins plugins, int dirfd, const char *dn,
+@@ -351,9 +358,7 @@ static int fsmDoMkDir(rpmPlugins plugins, int dirfd, const char *dn,
+ 	rc = fsmMkdir(dirfd, dn, mode);
+ 
+     if (!rc) {
+-	*fdp = fsmOpenat(dirfd, dn, O_RDONLY|O_NOFOLLOW, 1);
+-	if (*fdp == -1)
+-	    rc = RPMERR_ENOTDIR;
+	rc = fsmOpenat(fdp, dirfd, dn, O_RDONLY|O_NOFOLLOW, 1);
+     }
+ 
+     if (!rc) {
+@@ -378,47 +383,44 @@ static int ensureDir(rpmPlugins plugins, const char *p, int owned, int create,
+     char *sp = NULL, *bn;
+     char *apath = NULL;
+     int oflags = O_RDONLY;
+-    int rc = 0;
+ 
+     if (*dirfdp >= 0)
+-	return rc;
+	return 0;
+ 
+-    int dirfd = fsmOpenat(-1, "/", oflags, 1);
+    int dirfd = -1;
+    int rc = fsmOpenat(&dirfd, -1, "/", oflags, 1);
+     int fd = dirfd; /* special case of "/" */
+ 
+     char *path = xstrdup(p);
+     char *dp = path;
+ 
+     while ((bn = strtok_r(dp, "/", &sp)) != NULL) {
+-	fd = fsmOpenat(dirfd, bn, oflags, 1);
+	rc = fsmOpenat(&fd, dirfd, bn, oflags, 1);
+ 	/* assemble absolute path for plugins benefit, sigh */
+ 	apath = rstrscat(&apath, "/", bn, NULL);
+ 
+-	if (fd < 0 && errno == ENOENT && create) {
+	if (rc && errno == ENOENT && create) {
+ 	    mode_t mode = S_IFDIR | (_dirPerms & 07777);
+ 	    rc = fsmDoMkDir(plugins, dirfd, bn, apath, owned, mode, &fd);
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	fsmClose(&dirfd);
+-	if (fd >= 0) {
+-	    dirfd = fd;
+-	} else {
+-	    if (!quiet) {
+-		rpmlog(RPMLOG_ERR, _("failed to open dir %s of %s: %s\n"),
+-			bn, p, strerror(errno));
+-	    }
+-	    rc = RPMERR_OPEN_FAILED;
+	if (rc)
+ 	    break;
+-	}
+ 
+	dirfd = fd;
+ 	dp = NULL;
+     }
+ 
+     if (rc) {
+	if (!quiet) {
+	    char *msg = rpmfileStrerror(rc);
+	    rpmlog(RPMLOG_ERR, _("failed to open dir %s of %s: %s\n"),
+		    bn, p, msg);
+	    free(msg);
+	}
+ 	fsmClose(&fd);
+ 	fsmClose(&dirfd);
+-    } else {
+-	rc = 0;
+     }
+     *dirfdp = dirfd;
+ 
+@@ -1026,10 +1028,8 @@ setmeta:
+ 		/* Only follow safe symlinks, and never on temporary files */
+ 		if (fp->suffix)
+ 		    flags |= AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW;
+-		fd = fsmOpenat(di.dirfd, fp->fpath, flags,
+		rc = fsmOpenat(&fd, di.dirfd, fp->fpath, flags,
+ 				S_ISDIR(fp->sb.st_mode));
+-		if (fd < 0)
+-		    rc = RPMERR_OPEN_FAILED;
+ 	    }
+ 
+ 	    if (!rc && fp->setmeta) {
+-- 
+2.33.0
+
--- a/backport-Report-unsafe-symlinks-during-installation-as-a-spec.patch
+++ b/backport-Report-unsafe-symlinks-during-installation-as-a-spec.patch
@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+From 535eacc96ae6fe5289a2917bb0af43e491b0f4f4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Panu Matilainen <pmatilai@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 19 Aug 2024 11:43:33 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH] Report unsafe symlinks during installation as a specific case
+
+Conflict:don't modify testcode because the test code differs greatly, 0091214
+requires the root permission to run chown. However, the current test code
+cannot implement chown. Manual test cases will be used to guard test cases.
+Reference:https://github.com/rpm-software-management/rpm/commit/535eacc96ae6fe5289a2917bb0af43e491b0f4f4
+
+RPM refuses to follow non root owned symlinks pointing to files owned by
+another user for security reasons. This case was lumped in with
+O_DIRECTORY behavior, leading to confusing error message as the symlink
+often indeed points at a directory. Emit a more meaningful error message
+when encountering unsafe symlinks.
+
+We already detect the error condition in the main if block here, might
+as well set the error code right there and then so we don't need to
+redetect later. We previously only tested for the unsafe link condition
+when our O_DIRECTORY equivalent was set, but that seems wrong. Probably
+doesn't matter with the existing callers, but we really must not
+follow those unsafe symlinks no matter what.
+
+Co-authored-by: Florian Festi <ffesti@redhat.com>
+
+Resolves: #3100
+---
+ lib/fsm.c     | 10 ++++++----
+ lib/rpmfi.c   |  2 +-
+ 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/fsm.c b/lib/fsm.c
+index b5f8800a8..4c0968f73 100644
+--- a/lib/fsm.c
+++ b/lib/fsm.c
+@@ -304,7 +304,6 @@ static int fsmOpenat(int *wfdp, int dirfd, const char *path, int flags, int dir)
+     struct stat lsb, sb;
+     int sflags = flags | O_NOFOLLOW;
+     int fd = openat(dirfd, path, sflags);
+-    int ffd = fd;
+     int rc = 0;
+ 
+     /*
+@@ -314,7 +313,7 @@ static int fsmOpenat(int *wfdp, int dirfd, const char *path, int flags, int dir)
+      * it could've only been the link owner or root.
+      */
+     if (fd < 0 && errno == ELOOP && flags != sflags) {
+-	ffd = openat(dirfd, path, flags);
+	int ffd = openat(dirfd, path, flags);
+ 	if (ffd >= 0) {
+ 	    if (fstatat(dirfd, path, &lsb, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) == 0) {
+ 		if (fstat(ffd, &sb) == 0) {
+@@ -323,13 +322,16 @@ static int fsmOpenat(int *wfdp, int dirfd, const char *path, int flags, int dir)
+ 		    }
+ 		}
+ 	    }
+-	    if (ffd != fd)
+	    /* Symlink with non-matching owners */
+	    if (ffd != fd) {
+ 		close(ffd);
+		rc = RPMERR_INVALID_SYMLINK;
+	    }
+ 	}
+     }
+ 
+     /* O_DIRECTORY equivalent */
+-    if (!rc && dir && ((fd != ffd) || (fd >= 0 && fstat(fd, &sb) == 0 && !S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode))))
+    if (!rc && dir && fd >= 0 && fstat(fd, &sb) == 0 && !S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode))
+ 	rc = RPMERR_ENOTDIR;
+ 
+     if (!rc && fd < 0)
+diff --git a/lib/rpmfi.c b/lib/rpmfi.c
+index a3d8ad470..d8dbb67c7 100644
+--- a/lib/rpmfi.c
+++ b/lib/rpmfi.c
+@@ -2426,7 +2426,7 @@ char * rpmfileStrerror(int rc)
+     case RPMERR_DIGEST_MISMATCH: s = _("Digest mismatch");	break;
+     case RPMERR_INTERNAL:	s = _("Internal error");	break;
+     case RPMERR_UNMAPPED_FILE:	s = _("Archive file not in header"); break;
+-    case RPMERR_INVALID_SYMLINK: s = _("Invalid symlink");	break;
+    case RPMERR_INVALID_SYMLINK: s = _("Unsafe symlink");	break;
+     case RPMERR_ENOTDIR:	s = strerror(ENOTDIR);	break;
+     case RPMERR_ENOENT:	s = strerror(ENOENT); break;
+     case RPMERR_ENOTEMPTY:	s = strerror(ENOTEMPTY); break;
+-- 
+2.33.0
+
--- a/backport-Require-macro-filenames-to-end-in-alphanum-char.patch
+++ b/backport-Require-macro-filenames-to-end-in-alphanum-char.patch
@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+From 63e3061fa2471c663bed43d02f97c80953dfc9f7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Michal Domonkos <mdomonko@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 23 Oct 2024 15:45:07 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Require macro filenames to end in alphanum char
+
+Conflict:modify macro.c instead of macro.cc; use AT_{CHECK,CLEANUP}
+instead of RPMTEST_{CHECK,CLEANUP} because adafe8d04724b is not merged;
+use "/usr/lib/rpm" instead of $RPM_CONFIGDIR_PATH because f134eb1 and
+1592f16 are not merged; "mkdir -p $RPMTEST/usr/lib/rpm/macros.d/" to
+ensure directory exist.
+Reference:https://github.com/rpm-software-management/rpm/commit/63e3061fa2471c663bed43d02f97c80953dfc9f7
+
+Make sure (text editor) backup files, such as those with the tilde (~)
+at the end, aren't processed by our macrofiles globs.  These can appear
+while editing a macro file in place and may result in confusing behavior
+where an old version of a macro overrides the one being written, like
+seen in the ticket #3373.
+
+Rather than enumerating any specific suffixes, just mandate that macro
+files end with alphanumerics.  That's more of a name sanity check than
+anything but fits the bill here.
+
+Co-authored-by: Peter Oliver <git@mavit.org.uk>
+---
+ rpmio/macro.c     |  4 +++-
+ tests/rpmmacro.at | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/rpmio/macro.c b/rpmio/macro.c
+index 1a9f2f63a..11668b7ee 100644
+--- a/rpmio/macro.c
+++ b/rpmio/macro.c
+@@ -1981,9 +1981,11 @@ rpmInitMacros(rpmMacroContext mc, const char * macrofiles)
+ 
+ 	/* Read macros from each file. */
+ 	for (path = files; *path; path++) {
+	    size_t len = strlen(*path);
+ 	    if (rpmFileHasSuffix(*path, ".rpmnew") || 
+ 		rpmFileHasSuffix(*path, ".rpmsave") ||
+-		rpmFileHasSuffix(*path, ".rpmorig")) {
+		rpmFileHasSuffix(*path, ".rpmorig") ||
+		(len > 0 && !risalnum((*path)[len - 1]))) {
+ 		continue;
+ 	    }
+ 	    (void) loadMacroFile(mc, *path);
+diff --git a/tests/rpmmacro.at b/tests/rpmmacro.at
+index 50096fd5d..968d48ee7 100644
+--- a/tests/rpmmacro.at
+++ b/tests/rpmmacro.at
+@@ -2,6 +2,24 @@
+ #
+ AT_BANNER([RPM macros])
+ 
+# ------------------------------
+AT_SETUP([macro path: skip editor backups])
+AT_KEYWORDS([macros])
+RPMTEST_SETUP
+AT_CHECK([
+mkdir -p $RPMTEST/usr/lib/rpm/macros.d/
+echo '%this that' > $RPMTEST/usr/lib/rpm/macros.d/macros.this
+runroot rpm --eval '%{this}'
+mv $RPMTEST/usr/lib/rpm/macros.d/macros.this{,~}
+runroot rpm --eval '%{this}'
+],
+[0],
+[that
+%{this}
+],
+[])
+AT_CLEANUP
+
+ # ------------------------------
+ AT_SETUP([simple rpm --eval])
+ AT_KEYWORDS([macros])
+-- 
+2.33.0
+
--- a/backport-Support-ECDSA-in-key-parsing.patch
+++ b/backport-Support-ECDSA-in-key-parsing.patch
@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+From 8bc74f9ec48386beadf396ba5830aacf6672df4c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Michael Schroeder <mls@suse.de>
+Date: Thu, 11 Apr 2024 14:13:22 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Support ECDSA in key parsing
+
+Conflict:modify rpmpgp_internal.c in rpmio; adapt context because 296f2256b90
+and b5b9600834 is not mearged
+Reference:https://github.com/rpm-software-management/rpmpgp_legacy/commit/ca6c204cfa95f016ba03a73d5e6e4451cf8d4d6d
+---
+ rpmio/rpmpgp_internal.c | 17 +++++++----------
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/rpmio/rpmpgp_internal.c b/rpmio/rpmpgp_internal.c
+index 0fcd220..610a9b2 100644
+--- a/rpmio/rpmpgp_internal.c
+++ b/rpmio/rpmpgp_internal.c
+@@ -576,11 +576,6 @@ static int pgpCurveByOid(const uint8_t *p, int l)
+     return 0;
+ }
+ 
+-static int isKey(pgpDigParams keyp)
+-{
+-    return keyp->tag == PGPTAG_PUBLIC_KEY || keyp->tag == PGPTAG_PUBLIC_SUBKEY;
+-}
+-
+ static int pgpPrtPubkeyParams(uint8_t pubkey_algo,
+ 		const uint8_t *p, const uint8_t *h, size_t hlen,
+ 		pgpDigParams keyp)
+@@ -588,12 +583,12 @@ static int pgpPrtPubkeyParams(uint8_t pubkey_algo,
+     int rc = 1; /* assume failure */
+     const uint8_t *pend = h + hlen;
+     int curve = 0;
+-    if (!isKey(keyp))
+    if (keyp->tag != PGPTAG_PUBLIC_KEY && keyp->tag != PGPTAG_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
+ 	return rc;
+     /* We can't handle more than one key at a time */
+     if (keyp->alg)
+ 	return rc;
+-    if (pubkey_algo == PGPPUBKEYALGO_EDDSA) {
+    if (pubkey_algo == PGPPUBKEYALGO_EDDSA || pubkey_algo == PGPPUBKEYALGO_ECDSA) {
+ 	int len = (hlen > 1) ? p[0] : 0;
+ 	if (len == 0 || len == 0xff || len >= hlen)
+ 	    return rc;
+@@ -686,8 +681,9 @@ static int getPubkeyFingerprint(const uint8_t *h, size_t hlen,
+ 	    return rc;
+ 	se = (uint8_t *)(v + 1);
+ 	switch (v->pubkey_algo) {
+	case PGPPUBKEYALGO_ECDSA:
+ 	case PGPPUBKEYALGO_EDDSA:
+-	    /* EdDSA has a curve id before the MPIs */
+	    /* ECC has a curve id before the MPIs */
+ 	    if (se[0] == 0x00 || se[0] == 0xff || pend - se < 1 + se[0])
+ 		return rc;
+ 	    se += 1 + se[0];
+@@ -1206,8 +1202,11 @@ rpmRC pgpVerifySignature(pgpDigParams key, pgpDigParams sig, DIGEST_CTX hashctx)
+     if (sig == NULL || ctx == NULL)
+ 	goto exit;
+ 
+    /* make sure the dig param types are correct */
+     if (sig->tag != PGPTAG_SIGNATURE)
+ 	goto exit;
+    if (key && key->tag != PGPTAG_PUBLIC_KEY && key->tag != PGPTAG_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
+	goto exit;
+ 
+     if (sig->hash != NULL)
+ 	rpmDigestUpdate(ctx, sig->hash, sig->hashlen);
+@@ -1235,8 +1234,6 @@ rpmRC pgpVerifySignature(pgpDigParams key, pgpDigParams sig, DIGEST_CTX hashctx)
+      * done all we can, return NOKEY to indicate "looks okay but dunno."
+      */
+     if (key && key->alg) {
+-	if (!isKey(key))
+-	    goto exit;
+ 	pgpDigAlg sa = sig->alg;
+ 	pgpDigAlg ka = key->alg;
+ 	if (sa && sa->verify && sig->pubkey_algo == key->pubkey_algo) {
+-- 
+2.23.0
+
--- a/backport-Support-NIST-P-521.patch
+++ b/backport-Support-NIST-P-521.patch
@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+From 6344fec232cdd0e9d821a0b17e480494f4dcfd4b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Michael Schroeder <mls@suse.de>
+Date: Mon, 22 Apr 2024 12:54:32 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Support NIST P-521
+
+Conflict:don't modify digest_libgcrypt.c;modify digest_openssl.c in rpmio;
+Reference:https://github.com/rpm-software-management/rpmpgp_legacy/commit/6344fec232cdd0e9d821a0b17e480494f4dcfd4b
+
+Because the standard says we SHOULD.
+---
+ rpmio/digest_openssl.c   | 11 +++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/rpmio/digest_openssl.c b/rpmio/digest_openssl.c
+index 662b469..42eec66 100644
+--- a/rpmio/digest_openssl.c
+++ b/rpmio/digest_openssl.c
+@@ -556,6 +556,13 @@ static int constructECDSASigningKey(struct pgpDigKeyECDSA_s *key, int curve)
+ 	    OSSL_PARAM_END
+ 	};
+ 	key->evp_pkey = construct_pkey_from_param(EVP_PKEY_EC, params);
+    } else if (curve == PGPCURVE_NIST_P_521) {
+	OSSL_PARAM params[] = {
+	    OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string("group", "P-521", 5),
+	    OSSL_PARAM_octet_string("pub", key->q, key->qlen),
+	    OSSL_PARAM_END
+	};
+	key->evp_pkey = construct_pkey_from_param(EVP_PKEY_EC, params);
+     }
+     return key->evp_pkey ? 1 : 0;
+ #else
+@@ -565,6 +572,8 @@ static int constructECDSASigningKey(struct pgpDigKeyECDSA_s *key, int curve)
+ 	ec = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1);
+     else if (curve == PGPCURVE_NIST_P_384)
+ 	ec = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp384r1);
+    else if (curve == PGPCURVE_NIST_P_521)
+	ec = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp521r1);
+     if (!ec)
+ 	return 0;
+ 
+@@ -817,6 +826,8 @@ static int pgpSupportedCurve(int algo, int curve)
+ 	return 1;
+     if (algo == PGPPUBKEYALGO_ECDSA && curve == PGPCURVE_NIST_P_384)
+ 	return 1;
+    if (algo == PGPPUBKEYALGO_ECDSA && curve == PGPCURVE_NIST_P_521)
+	return 1;
+     return 0;
+ }
+ 
+-- 
+2.23.0
+
--- a/backport-Use-EVP_PKEY_verify-to-verify-DSA-signatures.patch
+++ b/backport-Use-EVP_PKEY_verify-to-verify-DSA-signatures.patch
@ -0,0 +1,316 @@
+From 8bf5c6b094e4f703d9fa1422a463654b512b25ae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Michael Schroeder <mls@suse.de>
+Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2024 11:05:17 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Use EVP_PKEY_verify to verify DSA signatures
+
+Conflict:modify digest_openssl.c in rpmio
+Reference:https://github.com/rpm-software-management/rpmpgp_legacy/commit/8bf5c6b094e4f703d9fa1422a463654b512b25ae
+
+The low level API will be deprecated in openssl-3
+---
+ rpmio/digest_openssl.c | 179 +++++++++++++++++++++++------------------------
+ 1 file changed, 86 insertions(+), 93 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/rpmio/digest_openssl.c b/rpmio/digest_openssl.c
+index 8dd7abe..2a39115 100644
+--- a/rpmio/digest_openssl.c
+++ b/rpmio/digest_openssl.c
+@@ -43,17 +43,12 @@ struct pgpDigKeyRSA_s {
+     BIGNUM *n; /* Common Modulus */
+     BIGNUM *e; /* Public Exponent */
+     EVP_PKEY *evp_pkey; /* Fully constructed key */
+-    unsigned char immutable; /* if set, this key cannot be mutated */
+ };
+ 
+ static int constructRSASigningKey(struct pgpDigKeyRSA_s *key)
+ {
+-    if (key->evp_pkey) {
+-        /* We've already constructed it, so just reuse it */
+-        return 1;
+-    } else if (key->immutable)
+-	return 0;
+-    key->immutable = 1;
+    if (key->evp_pkey)
+        return 1;	/* We've already constructed it, so just reuse it */
+ 
+     /* Create the RSA key */
+     RSA *rsa = RSA_new();
+@@ -88,7 +83,7 @@ static int pgpSetKeyMpiRSA(pgpDigAlg pgpkey, int num, const uint8_t *p)
+ 
+     if (!key)
+         key = pgpkey->data = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*key));
+-    else if (key->immutable)
+    else if (key->evp_pkey)
+ 	return 1;
+ 
+     switch (num) {
+@@ -238,7 +233,8 @@ static int pgpVerifySigRSA(pgpDigAlg pgpkey, pgpDigAlg pgpsig,
+     }
+ 
+ done:
+-    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
+    if (pkey_ctx)
+	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
+     free(padded_sig);
+     return rc;
+ }
+@@ -252,40 +248,41 @@ struct pgpDigKeyDSA_s {
+     BIGNUM *g; /* Base */
+     BIGNUM *y; /* Public Key */
+ 
+-    DSA *dsa_key; /* Fully constructed key */
+    EVP_PKEY *evp_pkey; /* Fully constructed key */
+ };
+ 
+ static int constructDSASigningKey(struct pgpDigKeyDSA_s *key)
+ {
+-    int rc;
+-
+-    if (key->dsa_key) {
+-        /* We've already constructed it, so just reuse it */
+-        return 1;
+-    }
+    if (key->evp_pkey)
+        return 1;	/* We've already constructed it, so just reuse it */
+ 
+     /* Create the DSA key */
+     DSA *dsa = DSA_new();
+     if (!dsa) return 0;
+ 
+     if (!DSA_set0_pqg(dsa, key->p, key->q, key->g)) {
+-        rc = 0;
+-        goto done;
+        goto exit;
+     }
+-
+     if (!DSA_set0_key(dsa, key->y, NULL)) {
+-        rc = 0;
+-        goto done;
+        goto exit;
+     }
+ 
+-    key->dsa_key = dsa;
+    /* Create an EVP_PKEY container to abstract the key-type. */
+    if (!(key->evp_pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()))
+	goto exit;
+ 
+-    rc = 1;
+-done:
+-    if (rc == 0) {
+-        DSA_free(dsa);
+    /* Assign the DSA key to the EVP_PKEY structure.
+       This will take over memory management of the RSA key */
+    if (!EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA(key->evp_pkey, dsa)) {
+        EVP_PKEY_free(key->evp_pkey);
+        key->evp_pkey = NULL;
+	goto exit;
+     }
+-    return rc;
+    return 1;
+
+exit:
+    DSA_free(dsa);
+    return 0;
+ }
+ 
+ 
+@@ -349,10 +346,10 @@ static void pgpFreeKeyDSA(pgpDigAlg pgpkey)
+ {
+     struct pgpDigKeyDSA_s *key = pgpkey->data;
+     if (key) {
+-        if (key->dsa_key) {
+-            DSA_free(key->dsa_key);
+        if (key->evp_pkey) {
+            EVP_PKEY_free(key->evp_pkey);
+         } else {
+-            /* If sig->dsa_key was constructed,
+            /* If key->evp_pkey was constructed,
+              * the memory management of these BNs
+              * are freed with it. */
+             BN_clear_free(key->p);
+@@ -367,82 +364,72 @@ static void pgpFreeKeyDSA(pgpDigAlg pgpkey)
+ /* Signature */
+ 
+ struct pgpDigSigDSA_s {
+-    BIGNUM *r;
+-    BIGNUM *s;
+-
+-    DSA_SIG *dsa_sig;
+    unsigned char *r;
+    int rlen;
+    unsigned char *s;
+    int slen;
+ };
+ 
+-static int constructDSASignature(struct pgpDigSigDSA_s *sig)
+static void add_asn1_tag(unsigned char *p, int tag, int len)
+ {
+-    int rc;
+-
+-    if (sig->dsa_sig) {
+-        /* We've already constructed it, so just reuse it */
+-        return 1;
+-    }
+-
+-    /* Create the DSA signature */
+-    DSA_SIG *dsa_sig = DSA_SIG_new();
+-    if (!dsa_sig) return 0;
+-
+-    if (!DSA_SIG_set0(dsa_sig, sig->r, sig->s)) {
+-        rc = 0;
+-        goto done;
+    *p++ = tag;
+    if (len >= 256) {
+	*p++ = 130;
+	*p++ = len >> 8;
+    } else if (len > 128) {
+	*p++ = 129;
+     }
+    *p++ = len;
+}
+ 
+-    sig->dsa_sig = dsa_sig;
+-
+-    rc = 1;
+-done:
+-    if (rc == 0) {
+-        DSA_SIG_free(sig->dsa_sig);
+-    }
+-    return rc;
+static unsigned char *constructDSASignature(unsigned char *r, int rlen, unsigned char *s, int slen, size_t *siglenp)
+{
+    int len1 = rlen + (!rlen || (*r & 0x80) != 0 ? 1 : 0), hlen1 = len1 < 128 ? 2 : len1 < 256 ? 3 : 4;
+    int len2 = slen + (!slen || (*s & 0x80) != 0 ? 1 : 0), hlen2 = len2 < 128 ? 2 : len2 < 256 ? 3 : 4;
+    int len3 = hlen1 + len1 + hlen2 + len2, hlen3 = len3 < 128 ? 2 : len3 < 256 ? 3 : 4;
+    unsigned char *buf;
+    if (rlen < 0 || rlen >= 65534 || slen < 0 || slen >= 65534 || len3 > 65535)
+	return 0;	/* should never happen as pgp's MPIs have a length < 8192 */
+    buf = xmalloc(hlen3 + len3);
+    add_asn1_tag(buf, 0x30, len3);
+    add_asn1_tag(buf + hlen3, 0x02, len1);
+    buf[hlen3 + hlen1] = 0;		/* zero first byte of the integer */
+    memcpy(buf + hlen3 + hlen1 + len1 - rlen, r, rlen);
+    add_asn1_tag(buf + hlen3 + hlen1 + len1, 0x02, len2);
+    buf[hlen3 + len3 - len2] = 0;	/* zero first byte of the integer */
+    memcpy(buf + hlen3 + len3 - slen, s, slen);
+    *siglenp = hlen3 + len3;
+    return buf;
+ }
+ 
+ static int pgpSetSigMpiDSA(pgpDigAlg pgpsig, int num, const uint8_t *p)
+ {
+-    BIGNUM *bn = NULL;
+-
+     int mlen = pgpMpiLen(p) - 2;
+     int rc = 1;
+ 
+     struct pgpDigSigDSA_s *sig = pgpsig->data;
+     if (!sig) {
+         sig = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*sig));
+	pgpsig->data = sig;
+     }
+ 
+-    /* Create a BIGNUM from the signature pointer.
+-       Note: this assumes big-endian data as required
+-       by the PGP multiprecision integer format
+-       (RFC4880, Section 3.2) */
+-    bn = BN_bin2bn(p+2, mlen, NULL);
+-    if (!bn) return 1;
+-
+     switch (num) {
+     case 0:
+-        if (sig->r) {
+-            /* This should only ever happen once per signature */
+-            BN_free(bn);
+-            return 1;
+-        }
+-        sig->r = bn;
+        if (sig->r)
+            return 1;	/* This should only ever happen once per signature */
+	sig->rlen = mlen;
+        sig->r = memcpy(xmalloc(mlen), p + 2, mlen);
+         rc = 0;
+         break;
+     case 1:
+-        if (sig->s) {
+-            /* This should only ever happen once per signature */
+-            BN_free(bn);
+-            return 1;
+-        }
+-        sig->s = bn;
+        if (sig->s)
+            return 1;	/* This should only ever happen once per signature */
+	sig->slen = mlen;
+        sig->s = memcpy(xmalloc(mlen), p + 2, mlen);
+         rc = 0;
+         break;
+     }
+ 
+-    pgpsig->data = sig;
+-
+     return rc;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -450,17 +437,10 @@ static void pgpFreeSigDSA(pgpDigAlg pgpsig)
+ {
+     struct pgpDigSigDSA_s *sig = pgpsig->data;
+     if (sig) {
+-        if (sig->dsa_sig) {
+-            DSA_SIG_free(sig->dsa_sig);
+-        } else {
+-            /* If sig->dsa_sig was constructed,
+-             * the memory management of these BNs
+-             * are freed with it. */
+-            BN_clear_free(sig->r);
+-            BN_clear_free(sig->s);
+-        }
+-        free(pgpsig->data);
+	free(sig->r);
+	free(sig->s);
+     }
+    free(pgpsig->data);
+ }
+ 
+ static int pgpVerifySigDSA(pgpDigAlg pgpkey, pgpDigAlg pgpsig,
+@@ -468,22 +448,35 @@ static int pgpVerifySigDSA(pgpDigAlg pgpkey, pgpDigAlg pgpsig,
+ {
+     int rc = 1; /* assume failure */
+     struct pgpDigSigDSA_s *sig = pgpsig->data;
+-
+     struct pgpDigKeyDSA_s *key = pgpkey->data;
+    unsigned char *xsig = NULL;		/* signature encoded for X509 */
+    size_t xsig_len = 0;
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
+ 
+     if (!constructDSASigningKey(key))
+         goto done;
+ 
+-    if (!constructDSASignature(sig))
+    xsig = constructDSASignature(sig->r, sig->rlen, sig->s, sig->slen, &xsig_len);
+    if (!xsig)
+        goto done;
+
+    pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(key->evp_pkey, NULL);
+    if (!pkey_ctx)
+        goto done;
+
+    if (EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pkey_ctx) != 1)
+         goto done;
+ 
+-    if (DSA_do_verify(hash, hashlen, sig->dsa_sig, key->dsa_key) == 1)
+    if (EVP_PKEY_verify(pkey_ctx, xsig, xsig_len, hash, hashlen) == 1)
+     {
+         /* Success */
+         rc = 0;
+     }
+ 
+ done:
+    if (pkey_ctx)
+	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
+    free(xsig);
+     return rc;
+ }
+ 
+-- 
+2.23.0
+
--- a/rpm.spec
+++ b/rpm.spec
@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 Name:          rpm
 Version:       4.18.2
-Release:       18
+Release:       23
 Summary:       RPM Package Manager
 License:       GPL-2.0-or-later
 URL:           https://rpm.org/
@ -48,9 +48,25 @@ Patch6025: backport-Fix-crash-on-Lua-file-trigger-exiting-with-return-ed.patch
 Patch6026: backport-Fix-V-option-usage-in-our-tests.patch
 Patch6027: backport-Remove-libtool-la-symlinks.patch
 Patch6028: backport-Specify-the-private-key-in-rpm-addsign.patch
+Patch6029: backport-Use-EVP_PKEY_verify-to-verify-DSA-signatures.patch
+Patch6030: backport-No-longer-use-the-low-level-API-in-openssl-3.patch
+Patch6031: backport-Add-ECDSA-support-to-digest_openssl.patch
+Patch6032: backport-Support-NIST-P-521.patch
+Patch6033: backport-Allow-signing-with-ECDSA-keys.patch
+Patch6034: backport-Support-ECDSA-in-key-parsing.patch
+Patch6035: backport-Fix-memleak-when-process-policies.patch
+Patch6036: backport-Enforce-the-same-sanity-checks-on-db-add-and-rebuild.patch
+Patch6037: backport-Fix-a-memory-leak-on-rpmdb-importdb.patch
+Patch6038: backport-Require-macro-filenames-to-end-in-alphanum-char.patch
+Patch6039: backport-Allow-version-to-be-omitted-in-the-replace-test-spec.patch
+Patch6040: backport-Fix-wrong-return-code-on-O_DIRECTORY-open-of-invalid.patch
+Patch6041: backport-Refactor-fsmOpenat-return-style-for-consistency-with.patch
+Patch6042: backport-Report-unsafe-symlinks-during-installation-as-a-spec.patch
+Patch6043: backport-Fix-FA_TOUCH-ed-files-getting-removed-on-failed-upda.patch

 Patch9000: Add-digest-list-plugin.patch
 Patch9001: Add-IMA-digest-list-support.patch
+Patch9002: Support-sm2p256v1-of-ECDSA-and-sm3-of-hash.patch

 BuildRequires: gcc autoconf automake libtool make gawk popt-devel openssl-devel readline-devel
 BuildRequires: zlib-devel zstd-devel >= 1.3.8 xz-devel bzip2-devel libarchive-devel ima-evm-utils-devel
@ -336,7 +352,22 @@ make clean
 %exclude %{_mandir}/man8/rpmspec.8*

 %changelog
-* Fri Oct 25 2024 hugel<xuce10@h-partners.com> - 4.18.2-18
+* Mon Dec 2 2024 hugel<gengqihu2@h-partners.com> - 4.18.2-23
+- sync patches from upstream
+
+* Wed Nov 27 2024 hugel<gengqihu2@h-partners.com> - 4.18.2-22
+- Require macro filenames to end in alphanum char
+
+* Tue Nov 26 2024 hugel<gengqihu2@h-partners.com> - 4.18.2-21
+- sync patches from upstream
+
+* Tue Oct 29 2024 xujing<xujing125@huawei.com> - 4.18.2-20
+- Support sm2p256v1 of ECDSA and sm3 of hash
+
+* Sat Oct 26 2024 Funda Wang <fundawang@yeah.net> - 4.18.2-19
+- fix RPM_LD_FLAGS not got exported
+
+* Fri Oct 25 2024 xuce<xuce10@h-partners.com> - 4.18.2-18
 - Separate the SELinux patch from the IMA digest list patch

 * Sun Sep 29 2024 hugel<gengqihu2@h-partners.com> - 4.18.2-17
@ -418,7 +449,7 @@ make clean
 * Tue Jun 20 2023 renhongxun<renhongxun@h-partners.com> - 4.18.1-1
 - upgrade version to 4.18.1

-* Wed Jun 21 2023 renhongxun<renhongxun@h-partners.com> - 4.18.0-11
+* Tue Jun 20 2023 renhongxun<renhongxun@h-partners.com> - 4.18.0-11
 - Fix per-file plugin hook regression introduced in 4.18

 * Mon Jun 19 2023 renhongxun<renhongxun@h-partners.com> - 4.18.0-10
--- a/still-in-use-of-python-scripts-from-old-version.patch
+++ b/still-in-use-of-python-scripts-from-old-version.patch
@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ index 0000000..d9c4832
 +#
 +# Support this by assuming that below each /usr/lib/python$VERSION/, all
 +# .pyc/.pyo files are to be compiled for /usr/bin/python$VERSION.
-+# 
+#
 +# For example, below /usr/lib/python2.6/, we're targeting /usr/bin/python2.6
 +# and below /usr/lib/python3.1/, we're targeting /usr/bin/python3.1
 +
Author	SHA1	Message	Date
openeuler-ci-bot	c4890fde7c	!438 [sync] PR-436: sync patches from upstream From: @openeuler-sync-bot Reviewed-by: @xujing99 Signed-off-by: @xujing99	2024-12-02 11:50:02 +00:00
hugel	39c9dfcf59	sync patches from upstream (cherry picked from commit de7cb1cd4d8584ae25c729e13b8e0050912da834)	2024-12-02 17:10:12 +08:00
openeuler-ci-bot	2ed0b383f9	!434 [sync] PR-430: Require macro filenames to end in alphanum char From: @openeuler-sync-bot Reviewed-by: @xujing99 Signed-off-by: @xujing99	2024-11-27 03:59:00 +00:00
hugel	e5d58d19d7	Require macro filenames to end in alphanum char (cherry picked from commit 698ba6426d83d1aa7b67127b4cd262ef23d59032)	2024-11-27 11:12:21 +08:00
openeuler-ci-bot	749f193f00	!427 [sync] PR-424: sync patches from upstream From: @openeuler-sync-bot Reviewed-by: @xujing99 Signed-off-by: @xujing99	2024-11-26 11:03:42 +00:00
hugel	69863c5692	sync patches from upstream (cherry picked from commit 30d8a11850652cd3ef7c05d1b140bd8c3dcb5f23)	2024-11-26 17:17:59 +08:00
openeuler-ci-bot	dd6fc7c370	!421 Support sm2p256v1 of ECDSA and sm3 of hash From: @xujing99 Reviewed-by: @shenyangyang01 Signed-off-by: @shenyangyang01	2024-10-31 03:47:08 +00:00
xujing	24cbd83f22	Support sm2p256v1 of ECDSA and sm3 of hash	2024-10-30 20:43:22 +08:00
openeuler-ci-bot	0396a74350	!415 [sync] PR-412: fix RPM_LD_FLAGS not got exported From: @openeuler-sync-bot Reviewed-by: @xujing99 Signed-off-by: @xujing99	2024-10-28 03:52:16 +00:00
Funda Wang	0a3f16e8fc	fix RPM_LD_FLAGS not got exported (cherry picked from commit 79449a6f79c719532324fe53c88000daf65a5135)	2024-10-28 11:04:14 +08:00